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1.  Introduction 
The  quasilinearity  assumption (informally  speaking,  the  assumption  that 
utility  is linear  in the  numeraire  good,  or  that  income  effects  are  absent  from 
the demand  of  nonnumeraire  goods)  makes  surplus  analysis  exact  in economies 
where  all agents  are  contemporaneous.  Efficiency  is then eq"ivalent  to the 
maximization of  social  surplus:  we  shall  refer  to this  fact  as  the  "global 
equivalence  principle."  But  in many  interesting  applications  the assumption of  a 
single  generation  is not  realistic, e.g.,  in long  lived  investment  programs  or  in 
the use  of  environmental  resources.  This  paper  provides  an  extension of 
traditional surplus  analysis  to a  world of  multiple,  overlapping  generations. 
In 'the  single  generation  case,  efficiency  is equivalent  to the  maximization 
of  social  surplus  provided  that  no  lower  bounds  exist  in the  final holdings  of 
numeraire.  If such  lower  bounds  do  exist,  then  one  could  have  efficient 
allocations  where  social  surplus  is not  at  its maximum.  Figures  1  and  2 
illustrate. Let  there be  one  generation  and  two people,  Person  1  and  Person  2. 
" I am  indebted  to Andreu  Mas-Colell  and  to Klaus  Nehring  for  useful comments. 
The  usual  caveat  applies. 
1  Social  surplus  can  often be  interpreted as  the  sum  of  all consumers'  and 
producer's  surpluses  plus  or  minus  a constant.  In addition to the 'equivalence 
principle",  cost-benefit  analysis  (or  the  Kaldor-Hicks  criterion) provides  a 
complete,  transitive ordering  in quasilinear,  single  generation  economies. 
See  Silvestre (1994)  for an  application of  the  model  in Section  2  below  to 
environment  a 1  resources. Utility of 
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Lower Bounds on  the Numeraire Suppose  that  there  are  only  two possible programs,  yo and  y*  (think  of  two 
mutually  exclusive  investment  projects,  or  two uses  of  a  natural  environment). 
Each  figure  offers  two utility  mini-frontiers, one  labelled  yo  and  the other  one 
labelled  y*,  constructed  as  follows.  The  utility mini-frontier  labelled  yo  is the 
utility  locus  that  results  from  implementing  yo  but  distributing  the  remaining 
amount  of  numeraire  in all conceivable  manners  between  the two persons.  The  one 
labelled  y*  is constructed  in a similar manner. 
Figure  1  reflects  the  absence  of  a lower  bound  on  the numeraire.  The 
utility  mini-frontiers are  then  infinite  straight  lines  of  slope  -1,  which 
intersect  the  axes  at the magnitude  of  the social  surplus  of  each  project.  As 
drawn,  project  y*  yields  a  higher  surplus  and,  thus,  y*  has  a utility mini- 
frontier  above  that  of  yo.  It  follows that  an  allocation  is efficient  if and  only 
if it implements  y*.  The  'equivalence  principle'  holds  without  qualification. 
But  it there  are  lower  bounds  on  the numeraire,  say,  if the  final holdings 
of  numeraire  are  required  to be  nonnegative,  then  the  utility mini-frontiers are 
no  longer  infinite lines:  they  are  truncated  as  in Figure  2.  It  is still true that  if 
surplus  is  maximized  (say,  a  utility pair  in the  segment  [B,Cl  is achieved),  then 
the corresponding  allocation  is efficient.  But  the converse  is no  longer  true.  The 
utility  pair  of  point  A  corresponds  to a  feasible allocation, but  surplus  is not 
maximized  there. 
The  "global  equivalence  principle'  no  longer  holds,  but  it turns  out  that  a 
'local'  version of  it does  hold.  The  problem  with point  A is that Person  2  has  a 
too small  an  amount  of  numeraire  there (she  has  zero  at point  D).  The  local 
version  can  be  stated  as  follows:  "efficiency  and  large  enough  individual holdings 
3  Plus  a  constant  that  reflects  the  initial availability  of  numeraire.  See 
footnote  6  below. of  numeraire  imply  surplus  maximization;  surplus  maximization  implies 
efficiency ." 
My  overlapping-generation  analysis  has  two parts:  finite time and  number 
of  generations  (T  <  w, Section  2  below),  and  infinite time and  number  of 
generations  (T  =  w, Section  3  below).  The  results of  the  finite case  are  similar 
to the ones  in the  single  generation case,  except  that  the model  has  now  one 
numeraire  for each  period:  the  global  equivalence  principle holds  if lower  bounds 
on  the numeraires  are  absent,  and  the local version holds  if such  lower bounds  are 
present  (Theorems  1,  2  and  3). 
The  infinite case  is more  subtle.  First,  no  efficient  allocations exist  if 
lower  bounds  on  the numeraires  are  absent  (Theorem  4).  The  statement 
'efficiency  implies  surplus  maximization"  is  then  vacuous,  and  the converse 
statement  is actually  false  (because  surplus  may  well attain a maximum  on  the 
set  of  feasible  allocations.) 
Second,  it matters  whether  individuals  discount  future numeraires  or  not. 
If  future  numeraires  are  not  discounted,  then  the  individual  holdings  of  numeraire 
must  be  small  at any  efficient  allocation (Theorem  5).  This  invalidates  any 
"equivalence  principle"  for  this case.  The  statement  "surplus  maximization 
implies  efficiency"  is here  false, because  one  can have  surplus  maximization  and 
large  individual  holdings  of  numeraire;  the  statement  'efficiency  implies  surplus 
maximization"  is also  false  (because  of  the lower  bounds:  see  point  A  in Figure 
2).  And  a  local  version of  the  type  "efficient  and  large enough  individual holdings 
of  numeraire  imply  surplus  maximization'  is  then basically  vacuous,  because  of 
Because  it implies  a  constant  MRS  between  two numeraires,  the quasilinear  OLG 
model  violates  the curvature  assumptions  often imposed  on  the non-quasilinear, 
OLG models,  which may  be  used  to show  that  the  set  of efficient  allocations is 
nonempty. the  incompatibility  between  efficiency  and  large  individual  holdings  of 
numeraire. 
But  the  local equivalence principle  is recovered  in the T  =  oo  case if  lower 
bounds  on  the  numeraires  are  present  and  future numeraires  are  discounted. 
Surplus  maximization  then  implies  efficiency  (Theorem  6)  and  efficiency  with 
large  individual  holdings  of  numeraire  imply  surplus  maximization (Theorem  7). 
2.  Finite  horizon  (T  <  oo) 
2.1.  Generat  ions  and  persons 
There  are  T+l generations  (T  <  oo)  . indexed  0,l  ,....  T,  and  T discrete time 
periods  i.ndexed  1 ,...,  T.  An  'old"  generation  (indexed  by  t-1) and  a 'young' 
generation  (indexed  by  t) coexist  at  each  t, t  =  1.....T.  By  convention.  Generation 
0  lives  only  in period  1  as  'old,"  and  Generation T lives only  in period  T as 
"young.'  For  t  =  1 ,....  T-1,  Generation  t  lives  for  two periods:  as  a young 
generation  in period  t, and  as  an  old generation  in period t+l  . There  are  Nt  people 
in Generation  t. A person  is identified  as  'Person  i of  Generation  t" (i =  1, ..., Ni, 
t  =  0, ...,  T),  and  indexed  by  the  double  subscript  (i,t). 
2.2.  Numeraires.  other  goods,  resources  and  technology 
A nonproduced  good  specific  to period  t, called  t-numeraire,  is available  i~n 
ot  units,  t  =  1,  ...,  T.  We  view  the  t-numeraire as  a  private, desirable, 
transferable,  divisible  and  nonstorable  good.  We  denote  by  Xi,t-l,t  the 
consumpl:ion  of  t-numeraire by  Person  i of  Generation  (t-1) (recall  that  t-1  is 
the old generation  in period  t), and  by  Xitt  the consumption  of  t-numeraire by 
Person i of  Generation t  (t is the  young  generation  in period  t). 
Moreover,  in each  period  t  there  are  Mt  additional  private  goods  (Mt 2 0) 
and  Qt  public  goods  (Qt 1  0).  Denote  by  yt  an  allocation of  such  goods,  and  write y  =  (y ,,...,y~  ).  The  set  of  vectors  y  that  could be  made  available,  perhaps  using 
large  amounts  of  the numeraires  as  inputs,  and  that  respect  any  constraints 
defining the consumption  set  of consumers,  is denoted  Y,  a  subset  of  a  finite- 
dimensional  Euclidean  space.5  Society's  technology  is defined  by  Y  and  the cost 
function: 
c:  Y  + RT+:  y  4  (Cl(y),...,CT(y)?. 
understood  as  follows: 'in  order  to make  the  vector  y  available,  society  must 
spend  Ct(y)  units  of  t-numeraire,  for  t  =  1, ...,  T.' 
Thi's  formulation  is rather  general.  It includes,  as  a  particular  case.  the 
situation where  the  only  relevant  arguments  of  Ct  are  those .in  yt. 
where  At., 
domain  Y. 
Sim 
Y, T5  R, 
2.3.  Consumption  sets  and  utilities 
The  consumption  set  of  Person  i of  Generation  t, for  t  =  1 ,..., T-1,  and  i = 
1,  ...,  Nt  is denoted  X  x  Y,  where  X  L  R~.  Her  utility  function  is  written: 
Uit:  X  x  Y  R:  ~it(xitt,xi,t,t+l  ,y)  =  xitt  At+l xi,t,t+l +  vit(y). 
1  is  a  positive real number  and  Vit  is  a  real-valued  function  with 
The  dimension  of  yt is (Nt-1+ Nt) Mt  +  Qt,  t  =  1 ,...,  T.  Thus,  Y  is a subset  of  a 
T 
(  [(Nt-l +  Nt)  Mt  +  Qt1)-dimensional  space.  t  = 1 We  consider  first the case  where  consumption  sets  do  not  impose  lower 
bounds  on  the consumption  of  the numeraires:  it is the quasilinear  case  in the 
strict  sense,  i.e.,  in the  sense  that  income effects  are  globally  absent.  Formally: 
Assum~tion  1:  absence  of  lower  bounds  on  the numeraires:  X  =  R2,  =  R.  - 
Remark  2.1.  No  particular  interpretation of  the numeraires  has  been  - 
imposed,  but  it would  be  natural  in many  instances  to visualize  the  t-numeraire 
and  the  (t+l)-numeraire as  being  physically  the  same  good  (say,  labor-leisure 
time)  located  at  the  two different  points  in time t  and  t+l,  respectively.  If 
Xt-1  =  1, then  the  two numeraires  are perfect  substitutes  with MRS  equal  to 
one,  in other  words,  individuals  do  not  discount  the  future (at  least  in what 
concerns  the  consumption of  labor-leisure  time).  If  Xt,l  5  1,  then  Xt,l  can be 
interpreted  as  Generation  t's time discount  factor  for  numeraire  when  old. 
Remark  2.2.  Note  that  no  i subscript  appears  in  Xt+l:  -  in other  words,  all 
members  of  the  same  generation  must  have  the  same  time discount  rate for 
numeraire.  This  is essential  to the  analysis.  Otherwise,  Assumption  1  would 
imply  thlat no  Pareto  efficient  allocations  exist  (two members  of  the  same 
generation  with different  MRS's  between  the  two numeraires  could  achieve 
infinite utilities by  exchanging  one  numeraire  against  the other).  If, on  the 
contrary, lower  bounds  on  the consumption  of  numeraires  are  assumed,  as  in 
Section  2.7  below,  then  different  X's  among  members  of  the  same  generation 
would  imply  that  no  Pareto  efficient  allocation is interior,  and  Theorem  3  would 
be  vacuous. 
Remark  2.3. Writing  Vit  as  a function of the  whole  vector  y  yields  - 
notational  simplicity  (and  generality):  the  whole  allocation  y  of  (nonnumeraire) 
private goods  and  public  goods  is  then  formally  viewed  as  a  vector  of  public goods,  but  (barring  consumption  externalities)  the only  relevant  arguments  in Vit 
will be  typic'ally be  the  public  goods  made  available in periods  t  and  t+l,  and  the 
private  goods  made  available  to Person i of  Generation t  in perim 
Remark  2.4. For  instance,  one  could have  --- 
~it(~)  =  witt(~t)  +  Pi,t+lwi,t,t+l(~t+l), 
where  j.ii,t:+l  is  a  real number,  and  Witt  and  Wi,t,t+lare real-val 
with  the  following  interpretations: 
ods  t  and  t+l. 
ued  functions, 
*  Witt(y) denotes  the  benefits  from  vector  yt  ,  which  accrue  to Person i 
of  Generation  t  when  young  ; 
* w i,t,t+l  (yt+l)  denotes  the benefits  from  vector  yt+l.-  which  accrue  to 
Person  i of  Generation  t  when  old; 
* jli,t+l (5  1)  is Person  (i,t)'s time discount  factor  for  the benefits  from 
vector  y  that  accrue  to Generation t  when  old:  possibly,  but  not  necessarily, 
Pi,t+t  =  Xt+l ;  in particular, one  may  well have  Pi,t+l z  ph,t+l ,  for  two 
members  I  and  h  of  Generation  t  (compare  with Remark  2.3  above). 
2.4.  Feasible  and  efficient  allocations 
A  fizible  allocation is  a  vector  (x:y), where: 
x  =  01  XN~,O.I:  Xiii.  X112:  ...  :  XN,,I.I.  X~,.i.2 :  Xitt. Xi,t,t+l:  ... : 
X1.T-I .T-1. X1.T-1  .T:..-:  XN~-,  ,T-1,~-I .XN~-~.T-I.T  : XITT:  XN~,T,T) 
T-1 
E  R~,  where  L  =  N,  +  2  Et=,  Nt  +  NT , 
y  E  Y,  and 
Nt-1  for t  ::  1 ,...,  T,  E.  N  t 
1=  1  xi.t-1.t  + ,  Xitt  +  Ct(y) =  ot. 
Note  that,  for  convenience,  the  resource  constraint  is  written as  an 
equality  instead of  the  more  common  weak  inequality. Define: 
?  =  {y E Y  1 there exists an  x  E  R~  such  that  (x:y)  is a  feasible  allocation). 
Adopt  the  notational conventions  Xo  =  X1  :=  1,  and  Co(y) :=  0,  for  all y  E  Y. 
Write,  for t  =  0,1 ,...,  T,  At  :=  XoX1  ....  Xt . Define  the social  sur~lus  function: 
T 
S:  9 + R:  S(y)  =  N  t 
=O  At [xi=l  vit(y) -  Ct(y)I. 
The  social  surplus  is a  weighted  sum  of  utilitites, where  the weight  of 
Person i of  Generation t  is At. 6 
Definition: A  feasible allocation  (x1;y') Pareto  dominates  another  feasible 
allocation  (x:  y)  if no  person  is better off  at (x;y)  than  at  (x';yl),  and  at  least 
one  person  of  is better off  at  (x';yl)  than  at  (x;y). 
Definition: A  feasible  allocation  (x1:y') stronalu  Pareto  dominates  another 
feasible  allocation  (x;  y) if every  person  is better  off  at (x';yl)  than  at  (x;y). 
Definition:  A  feasible allocation  (x:y)  is Pareto  efficient if  there  does  not 
exist  a  feasible  allocation  (x1:y') that  Pareto  dominates  (x;y). 
6  Plus  a  constant  term. Indeed,  using  the resource  equality  that  defines  a 
T 
feasible  allocation, one  can compute:  TtZO 
N  t  No 
At uit  =  Ao  xi01  i=  1 Definition:  A  feasible allocation  (x:y)  is weaklu  Pareto  efficient if  there 
does  not  exist  a  feasible  allocation  (x';yl)  that  strongly  Pareto dominates  (x;y). 
2.5.  The  maximization  of  surplus  implies  efficiency 
In order  to facilitate the comparison  among  sections,  the  statement  of  the 
theorems  below  make  explicit  all maintained  assumptions. 
Theorem  1.  Let  T <  00.  If an  allocation  (x*;y*)  is such  that  y* maximizes 
the  function S(y)  9,  then (xU;y*) is Pareto  efficient. 
Proof. Follows  immediately  from  the  observation  that  the  social  surplus  is  -- 
a  weighted  sum  of  utilities,  with positive  weights  (see  previous  Section). 
Remark  2.5.  Note  that  Assumption  1  is not  needed  for  Theorem  1:  the 
Theorem  holds  under  any  specification of  the consumption sets. 
Remark  2.6.  Theorem  1  states  that  "surplus  maximization * efficiency.'  It 
trivially  implies  the  weaker  statement:  'surplus  maximization *  weak 
efficiency  ." 
2.6.  (Weak)  efficiency  implies  the  maximization  of  surplus. 
Theorem  2:  T <  CQ  and  assume  the  absence of  lower  bounds  on  the 
numeraires.  If (x*;y*)  is  weaklu  Pareto  efficient,  then  y* maximizes S on 9. 
Proof.  Appendix. 
Remark  2.7.  Theorem  2  states  that  'weak  efficiency  surplus 
maximization."  It trivially  implies  the  weaker  statement:  'efficiency  *  surplus 
maximization." 2.7.  Lower  bounds  in  the  consumption  of  the  numeraires 
Consider  next  the case  of  lower bounds  on  the numeraires. It  is convenient 
to choose  zero  as  the lower  bound.  The  choice  is not  particularly  restrictive 
because  no  sign assumptions  are  imposed  on  o  or on  C(y). 
Assumption  2:  Dresence of  lower  bounds  on  the numeraires:  X  =  R+~,  X  =  R+.  -- 
Assumption  3.  There  exist  positive numbers  Tand TT such  that:  -- 
I ~it(~)  I  c  V for all y  E  9, i = I  ....  Nt,  t  =  0.1 .....  T: 
Ic~(~)  1  < € for  all y  E  9,  t  =  1 ,...,  T. 
Remark  2.8.  Assumption  3  is automatically  satisfied  when  the  functions  -- 
Vit  and  Ct  are  continuous  and  the  set  9  is compact. 
Th'eorem 3.  Let  T  <  w, assume  the  presence  of  lower  bounds  on  the  -- 
numerairlxand postulate  Assumption  3.  There  exists  a  real number  B such  that  if 
(xM;y*)  Lsweaklu Pareto  efficient.  and  if x*~,~-~  ,t 2 B and  xSitt  1. B . i  =  1 ,...,  Nt. 
t  =  1 ,...,  T,  then  y*  maximizes S on 9. 
Prioof.  Appendix.  -- 
Remark  2.9.  Theorem  2  states  that  "weak  efficiency  and  large enough  xff's *  -- 
surplus  maximization."  It  trivially  implies  the  weaker  statement:  'efficiency  and 
large  enough  xM's * surplus  maximization." 
3.  Infinite  horizon  (T  =  w) 
Now  1 extend  the model  of  Sections  2.1-2.4 and  2.7 to the case  T =  m. As 
in there,  Generation  0  lives only  in period  0  as  old.  The  set  Y  as  well as  the 
range  of  C  are  subsets  of  Rw. Denote  by  2  the  set  of  positive  integers  {I  ,2,....). 
In obvious  extension,  a feasible  allocation is a vector  (x;y),  where: 
x  =  :  XN~,O,~:  X111,  X112:  ...  :  %,,1,1,  q1,1.2  : .... i  Xitt. Xi,t,t+l:...)  E  Rm. Nt-1 
YE  Y,  and  fort =  1 ,...,  00, z. 
N t 
1=1  xi,t-1  ,t  +  E.  xitt +  Ct(y) =  ot, and,  as  before, 
1=  1 
define: 
'l =  {y E Y  1 there exists an  x  E  Rw such  that  (x:y)  is a  feasible  allocation). 
The  meaning  of  Pareto  domination  and  efficiency  is the  straightforward 
extension of  the previous  definitions  to the  infinite horizon.  Strong  Pareto 
domination,  in particular, means  that  all persons  in all generations,  i.e,,  an 
infinite number  of  consumers,  are  better  off. 
Theorem  4.  Let  T  =  m. In the  absence  of  lower  bounds  on  the numeraires, 
the  set  o'f  weaklu  Pareto  efficient  allocations  is emotu. 
Proof.  Appendix.  -- 
Theorem  4  motivates  us  to restrict our  attention to the  model  with lower 
bounds  on  the  numeraries,  i.e.,  to postulate  Assumption  2, extended  to cover  all t 
E 2. 
Next  we  show  that,  if  future numeraires  are  not  discounted,  then 
efficiency  is  incompatible  with large  individual  holdings  of  numeraire. 
Theorem  5.  Let  T  =  w, assume  the  Dresence of  lower  bounds  on  the  - 
numeraires,  and  let  there  be  a  fz  0  such  that  Xt 2 1  for  all  t 2 f. Let (x:y)  be 
N t 
a  feasible  allocation.  If there exists  an  6'> 0 such  that Z.  Xitt 26'.  for  all t 
I=  1 
E  2,  then (x;y) is not  weaklu  Pareto  efficient. 
Corollaru.  Let  T =  m , assume  the  oresence  of  lower  bounds  on  the 
numeraires  and  let  there  be  a  fl  0  such  that  Xt 2 1  for  all  t 2 f. M  (x;y)  is 
yeaklu Pareto  efficient, then.  aiven  E  > 0, there exists  a  fl~)  such  that Realling  that,  At  :=  XoX  ,....kt  and  that, by  convention,  Xo =  XI  :=  1  and 
Co(y) :=  0,  define, 
00  N  t 
Y'  =  {y E 7  1 the  series  EtZ0 A  El  ~it(y)  -  Ct(y)l converges}. 
and  the social  surplus  function: 
ASSU~D~~O~  4.  There exists  a  X  <  1  and  a f  >  1  such  than At I. r,  for all t 2 f, 
t€  Z. 
Assumption  5. There  exist positive numbers  w,Krand €such  that: 
loti ,  tor  all t  E  z : 
Nt  < IT  for  all t  E  Z u  {O}; 
I vit(y)  1  <  V for  all y  E  9, i =  1 ....,  Nt, t  E  Z  u {O}: 
IctlY) I  < € for  all y  E  P,  t  E  z . 
It  is easy  to show  (see  Lemma  2(iii) in the Appendix)  that,  under 
assumptions  4  and  5,  Y*  =  9, i.e.,  the  function S  is well defined on  9. 
The  next  two Theorems  make  precise  the 'local  equivalence  principle'  for 
the  infinite horizon case.  Theorem  6  says  that  'surplus  maximization  implies 
efficiency  (and,  a  fortiori, weak  efficiency),  whereas  Theorem  7  says  that 'weak 
efficiency  plus  large  individual  holdings  of  numeraire  imply  surplus 
maximization" (and,  a  fortiori, that  'efficiency  plus  large  individual holdings  of 
numeraire  imply  surplus  maximization.') 
Theorem  6. Let  T  =  w  , assume  the  presence  of  lower  bounds  on the 
numeraires,  and  postulate  Assumptions  4  and  5.  If (x*;ya)  is feasible and  y* 
maximizes  S  9,  then (xa;ya) is  Pareto  efficient. Assum~tion  6.  There exists a  t>  0  such  that  Xt 1  E,  for all t  E  2, t  >  1. 
Theorem  7. Let  T =  m . assume  the presence of  lower  bounds  on  the 
numeraires  and  postulate  Assum~tions  4. 5  and  6.  There exists  a real number  B 
such  that  if (x*;y*) is weaklu  Pareto efficient, and  if ~*~,~-,,t  1  B and  x*itt L  B, 
i =  1 .....  Nt, t  E  2, then y* maximizes S  on '?. 
Proof.  Appendix. 
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Section  2  in the main text  considers  a  finite number  of  periods  (T  <  00). 
whereas  Section  3  covers  the infinite case  (T  =  00).  Here I define  some 
functions,  which  will be  used  in the proofs,  in an  encompassing  formulation 
that  includes  both the 'T  <  m'  and  the  'T  =  w" cases. 
Recall  that  Z  denotes  the  set  of  positive integers.  Write O for  the set 
of  time periods,  which  is the  finite set  {t E  Zlt  5 TI in Section  2  and  the 
infinite set  Z  in Section  3. 
The  domain of  the  surplus  - 
automatically  have  that  Y*  =  Y. 
function  S  is denoted  Y*.  If T  <  oo, then  we 
If T  =  m,  then  Assumption  5  guarantees  that 
,. 
Y*  =  Y, see  Lemma  2  below. 
Denote  by  A  the  set  of  strictly positive sequences  of  real numbers,  one 
for  each  generation  (i.e.,  positive,  finite sequences  of  the  form  {do,&  ,,...,&TI  in Section  2, or  positive  infinite  sequences  of  the  form  {~i~.oc~,...,oct,...}  in Section 
3 .I 
Given  y*  E  Y*  and oc  E  A, define  the  functions: 
Gtt[yU:d] :  Y*  -+  R,  T  E  O , 
by  the  following  expressions  (which  leave  'implicit  the  symbols  '[y*]'  in the 
notation  for  the  A  functions). 
A1  dl  Note  that  Gil2  = -  2  [Avip - G1 1 - -  N2  AS(y)] , 
For  t  >  1, define: Lemma  1.  d  E  A,  and  let  (xw:y*)  be  a  feasible  allocation,  with y*  E  Y*. 
Let  y'  E Y*.  Define  - 
Nt-1  N t 
(i)  C  xlLt-i  ,t +  C iitt  +  ct(y')  =  oi,  for t  E  B, t  <  T. 
i=1  i=l 
(i  i)  Assume  that   AS(^')  :=  ~(y')  - S(yU) > 0. Proof: 
( i )  Consider  first the case  t  1 .  Recall  that,  by  convention, lo  =  X1 =  A.  = 
No  N  1 
A,  =  1, and  that,  by  feasibil 
compute: 
Fort >  1,  t  <  T: This  proves  (i). 
( i i )  For  Person  i, Generat  ion  0, i  =  1 ,...,No: 
* 
uio(~~ol,y')  =  X'  iol  +  vio(y')  =  x  101 -  G~o(Y')  +  ViO  (y') 
*  *  do 
=  Xi01 -  vio(y')  +  ViO  (y  )  + -  As(y')  +  ViO  (Y9 
N 0 because  both  dg and   AS(^')  are positive. 
For  Person  i, Generation  t  (t E  @,  t  <  T,  i  =  1 ,....  Nt) 
because  both dt  and   AS(^')  are  positive. Proof  of  Theorem  2. 
a 
Suppose,  by  way  of contradiction, that  there is a  y'  E  Y  with 
s(~')  >  ~(y*).  Define 
and  define x'  by: 
*  * 
We  want  to show  that  (x':y')  strongly  Pareto dominates  (x  :y  )  By 
Lemma  l(ii), all persons  in generations  0 to T-1  are better off  at (x';y')  than 
*  * 
at  (x  ;y  1.  So  are  all persons  in Generation  T,  because: because  B >  0  and   AS(^')  >  0. 
Lemma  1 (i) guarantees  that  the  resource constraints 
Nt-1  N t 
' x  x'i,t-l,t  +  xiitt  +  c~(~')  =  a''  are  satisfied  for  t  1 ..... T-1. 
We  are  left with showing  that  th 
that  z  X~T-I  ,T  +  ~X;TT  =  OT - 
is is also the case  for  t  =  T.  Recalling 
* 
CT(Y  1,  we compute: where  (2.1)  h~as  been  used 
Proof  of  Theorem  3. 
Because,  by  Assumption  3,  Vit and  Ct are bounded  from above  and  from  - 
below  on  Y,  so  are  the  functions 
* 
Gttly  ;a],  t  =  1. ....  T-1.  Gi,t,t+l[y*;~~,  t  =  0.  1. ....  T-1  and  the  function aiT 
-  2 
defined as  EIT : '?  -.  R  : G~T(Y')  =  AV~T  [~*](IJ')-AS(~') -  (where 2  is defined 
N  T 
in (2.1)).  Choose  B  such  that: *  *  * 
Let  (x  ;y  )  be  Weakly  Pareto  Efficient  and  let  Xitt 2  6,  i =  t, ....  - 
* 
Nt, Xi,t-l ,t  B,  i  =  1, ..., Nt-1,  t  =  1, ..., T.  Assume,  as  contradiction  - 
I  - 
hypothesis,  that  there exists  a  y  E  Y  such  that  ~(y')  > s(~*).  Define: 
Because  Gi,t-1  ,t(y')  <  B, t  =  1 .....  T.  i =  1 .....  Nt-1.  Gitt  <  B, t  =  1 ....,  T-1, i 
=  1 ....,  Nt, and  giT(Y')  <  B  i  =  1. .... NT. we have  that  x'  i,t-1  ,t > 0  and  x'itt  >  0. 
Vi, Vt.  Lemma  1  and  the proof  of  Theorem  2  shows  that  (x':~')  strongly  Pareto 
* 
dominates  (x  ;y  ).  ,Contradiction. Proof  of  Theorem  4. 
Given  i3  feasible  allocation  (x:y),  choose  a  positive number  E  and  define 
/ 
the numeraire allocation  x  by: We  first check  that  (xf:y) is a  feasible allocation.  For  t  =  0.  1, ... .  we 
compute 
the last  eq~~ality  following  from the  fact  that  (x;y)  is  feasible. 
Seconld,  everybody  prefers  (xf:y) to (x:y),  because  for i =  1. ....  No. 
and  for i =  1,  ....  ~t,  t  E  2: Thus,  I:X':~)  strongly  Pareto  dominates  (x:y). 
Proof  of  Theorem  5. 
Step  1.  Definition  of  x: 
We  want  to show  that  (x:y)  is  strongly  Pareto  dominated  by  the 
allocation  (x'';~),  where  x'  is defined next  . 
Define: 1 
(clearly,  E  >  0)  and  write:  L  =  E  Xl  ...  Xf  X2  ...  Xf  [' 
+
 
+ .  +  11  Xf  ' 
O0  1 
As  is well known,  the series  -  converges  to a  real number,  to be 
n=  1 
n2 
denoted  by  a  (a =  1.645).  Define  the consumption  allocation  x'  as  follows. Step  2.  (xriU) satisfies  the  resource  constraints. 
For  t  =  0,  ...,  t?  the  argument  in the proof  of  Theorem  4  applies.  Thus, 
let t  >  f.  We  compute: because  (x::y)  is  feasible. 
Step  3:  x:'  is  nonneqative. 
Clearly,  for  t  E  (01 U  2. ~'~~~,t+l  >  Xi,t.t+j 2  0,  because  (x:y)  is feasible. 
Thus.  we  are  left  with proving  that  xttt 2 0,  t  E  2.  Consider  first the case 
t 5 f.  Then:  - 
1 
1 xitt - E  - 
+  ...  + - 
A1  ...  At  A2  ...  At  At  I 
because,  by  the definition of  E, Because,  by  a~ssumption,  Xitt 2  -  I?,  we have  that  Xitt  >  0,  t  =  1, .... f. 
If t  > f, then,  using  the definitions of  a,  L  and  E: 
/  L  f-t 
-  Xitt  =  Xitt - &  Nta 
t=l 
by  the same  argument  as  in the previous  case. Step  4.  Lverubodu  is  better  off  at  (x';~) 
Clearly,  any  person  i  of  Generation  0 is better  off  at  (x':y)  than at  (x;y). 
because  (x':y)  entails  a utility  gain  of  E/N~  > 0. 
If  t  =  1. .... f-1, i  =  1. ....  Nt,  then  uit(iitt,  ~'~,~,~+l,Lj)  > 
uit(xitt, Xi,t,t+l, y)  by  the  argument  in the proof  of  Theorem  4. 
For  t  =  t?  i  =  1 ,...,  Nf,  we  compute,  recalling that 1cl L  1: Lemma  2.  Let T  =  00, assume  the presence  of  lower  bounds  on  the numeraires 
and  ~ostulate  Assum~tions  4  and  5.  (x;y)  be  feasible. 
(i)  The  series  obtained  bu  summina  the seauence: 
converses. 
*-  a 
(iii) Y  =  Y,  i.e.,  the  function S  is  well defined  onY. Proof: 
( i )  The  sequence  {k}  is nonnegative by  the assumption of  lower  bounds  on  the 
numeraries.  Convergence  of  the  series  will follow  after showing  that 
the sequence of  partial  sums  is bounded. 
By  feasibility,  for  t  E  Z 
N t 
and  becausex  Xitt q  - 0, we  have  that: 
i-1 
i.e.,  using  Assumption  5: 
By  the  same  argument: L.et  m  >  2(? - 1) ,  define m*  by:  m*  =  m,  if m even,  m*  =  m+l,  if m odd, 
and  write t* =  m*/2.  We  compute  the partial sum  of  the  first m  terms of  {kn).  and 
apply  (6.1)  and  (6.2)  as  follows. 
m 
Thus,  the sequence  of  partial sums  is bounded  and  the infinite sum  xkn 
n=  1 
converges. m 
(i  i)  By  an  argument  similar  to the one  in (i), the series Eht  1 ctly)  ( 
t=l 
m 
converges.  Therefore.  zhtct(y) converges  absolutely  and,  thus,  it 
t=l 
m  Nt 
converges.  The  same  argument  proves  the convergence of Xht  vit(y). 
t=O  i=l 
(i  i  i  Immediate  from  (ii). 
Proof  of  Theorem  6. 
*  * 
Suppose  not,  i.e.,  let  (x':~')  Pareto  dominate  (x  ;y  ),  i.e..  writing 
with at  leas't one  inequality  strict. 
Multiplying  both  sides  of  each  inequality  in (6.3)  by  At we have: 
with at  least  one  of  the inequalities  in (6.4)  strict By  Lemma  2(ii), the  infinite sums  CAtCvit(yt)  and  ChtCvit(yW) 
converge  to,  :say, 
* 
v'  and  v  , 
respectively. 
Denote by  {ktn} (resp.  {k;})  the  specialization to the  feasible  allocation 
ff  *  * 
(x ;y  )  (resp.  I:x  :y  1)  of the sequence  {kn} defined  in the statement  of  Lemma 
* 
2(i), and  denote  its infinite sum  by  cf (resp.  6  ).  The  sequence: 
is obtained  from {kfn) by  inserting parentheses  (its first term is  kfl  its second 
term is k
f
2  +  k
f
3. its m-th term is kf2m-2  +  kf2m-1).  Therefore,  its infinite sum 
converges  to c',  i.e.. *  * 
Using  (6.5)  and  repeating the  argument  for  (x  :y  ),  we  have  that  the infinite 
sum  of  the left-hand  side  (resp.  right-hand  side)  terms  of  (6.4)  converges  to 
5'  +  v'  (resp.  5*+ u*).  Because  at  least  one of  the inequalities  in (6.4)  is 
strict.  we  obtain: 
Now  the  sequence: 
is  also obtained  by  inserting  parentheses  in {k;l)  (its first  term equals  k;  +  ki, 
and  its m-th terms equals  kf2rn-l  +  kr2rn).  Thus,  its infinite sum  also converges 
to kt, i.e.. But  feasibility  implies  that 
00 
which,  using  Lemma  2(ii) implies  that  xhtwt  converges  and: 
t=1 
or,  using  (6.5)  and  the definition of  social  surplus: 
Similarly, 
But  by  (6.6). 5'  +  v'  > 5*  +  v*, i.e..  ~(y')  > s(~*),  contradicting the  fact 
*  - 
that  y  maxi~mizes  S  on  Y. Proof  of  Theorem  7. 
Ste~  1.  Definition  and  ~rooerties  of  do, ..., dt, ... 
1 
Write:  $  = -  ,  and  define 
2At-I 
We  check  that  the  &'s  are  all positive.  If t  < 1 - 1, then  the sign of  Zt 
1 
is that  of  1  - $Af-1 = -  >  0.  For  t 2  f - 1, the sign of  & is that of  1 - Xt+l 
2  - 
>  1 - %  >  O,,  because t  +  1  is then  greater  than or  equal  to 1.  - 
We  can  compute: 
Define the  sequence  (31  ,32,...,3n..--) := The  first term in the  sequence,  '61,  can  be  written, using  (7.1-3) 
i-  2 
1 -prit 
t  =O  1  AT-1  --  I  8(i  -xi)  1 
- -  -  Olt-1  =  8--- 
1 
'61  =  =  8-  - 8-  +  8  =  8. 
Ai-1  Xi  At  Ai  A i  xi  xi 
Similarly,  the  second  term,  32,  can  we  written: 
and  recursively: 
i.e.,  {Zfl ,  ..., iln,  ...I  is the constant  sequence  {$,  ....  8, ...). 
Ste~  2.  Uwndedness  of  the  functions  Gtt, Gi,t,t+l -  on  Y*. 
Consider  the  functions  G~~~[Y*;GI,  t  EZ, i  =  1 ,...,  Nt, and  Gi,t,t+l  [y*:;], 
t  E  {0} u 2,  i  =  1, ..., Nt, as  defined  above  at the  beginning  of  this  Appendix. 
for  y*  as  in the statement  of  the  Theorem  and  for 2 as  defined  in Step  1.  We 
leave  implicit, in  what  follows, the  symbol  [y*;zl.  We  want  to show  that  they 
are  uniformlg  bounded  from above,  i.e.,  that  there  is a positive number  B such that  Gtt(y) <  0, for all  y E  Y*,  and  all t  E  2,  and  Gi,t,t+l(y) <  B, for  all  y  E 
Y*,  all t  E  {O} U  Z and  all  i  E  11, ..., Nt}. 
Consider  first Gtt, t  E  Z,  and let  y  E  Y*.  We  write: We  walnt  to show  that  all terms  in the  last  expression are  bounded  from 
t-1 
z=O 
above  and  from  below.  By  (7.4), for  t 2 f  we have  that 
B  -- 
AtNt  -  >  0. 
N t 
B 
t - 1 




l im At  =  0  (by  Assumption  4), one  has  that  l im  =  1.  By  Assumption 
t+m  t+w t=O 
Nz 
5. I ACr(y) I  <  2r and  I ZAvhz(~)  I  <  2rr  The  argument  in the proof  of 
h=  1 
t  t-1  Nt 
Lemma  2(i) then  shows  that  C  AtACr(y). C  AtAvhz(y) 
t=1  t=O  h=l 
00  a,  N  Xt  ...  Xr 
,  CXt+  I... &ACt(y)  and  C  C  I+  Avhr(y)  are bounded  from above  and 
from  below  on  Y*.  It follows  that  all four  terms  of  the last  expression  for Gtt(y) are  allso  bounded  from  above  and  from below.  Summarizing,  there exist 
real  numbers  b* and  b-  such  that,  for  y  E  Y*  and  t  E  2, 
Consider  now  the  function  Gi,t,t+l, t  E  {0} u Z, i E  {l,  ...,  Nt}.  As  above  in 
the  first paragraphs  of  the  present  Appendix,  we  write: 
By  the previous  argument,  Avit(y) and  AS(y) are  bounded  from  above  and  from 
A 
dt 
below.  So  is - Gtt(y) (by  7.5). --  (by  7.1 -2 and  Assumption  5), and  Xt+l  (by 
N t 
Assumptions  4  and  6).  Thus,  there  is a  real  number  6 such  that,  for  y  E  Y*  and 
t  E  {O}  U  2, 
Gi,t,t+l(y)  <  6  . 
Write  B  =  max  {b+, 6). 
Step  3.  Q~ntradiction araument. 
*  *  *  * 
Let  (x  :y  )  be  Pareto efficient, and  let  xi,t-1 ,t L  B  and  Xitt L  B, t  E  2,  -  - 
*  * 
i  =  1, ..., Nt,  We  want  to show  that  y  maximizes  S  on  Y .  Suppose  not,  i.e., 
let there be  yf E y*  with  AS(^')  :=  ~(y')  - ~(y*)  > 0. * 
Because  xist-1  .t  <  B  and  xYtt  <  B, t  E  2.  we have  that  > 0  and 
/  2  xitt >  0,  for alI t  E  Z,  1.e..  xi01 E  %+ and  (iitt  X~,~,~+I)  E  5%-  for all t  E  2. 
Lemma  1  then implies  that  (x';  y')  dominates,  in the strong Pareto  tense. 
*  *  *  * 
(x  :y  1,  contradicting  the  fact  that  (x  ;y  )  is  weakly  Pareto Efficient. 